Nanotechnology : Essay

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Benj2 — Fri, 07 Dec 2007 10:15:41 +0000

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Are We Enlightened Guardians, or Are We Apes Designing Humans?

Benj — Wed, 11 Oct 2006 22:33:46 +0000

By Douglas Mulhall Most students of artificial intelligence are familiar with this forecast made by Vernor Vinge in 1993[1]: "Within thirty years, we will have the technological means to create superhuman intelligence. Shortly after, the human era will be ended." That was thirteen years ago. Many proponents of super-intelligence say we are on track for that deadline, due to the rate of computing and software advances. Skeptics argue this is nonsense and that we're still decades away from it. But fewer and fewer argue that it won't happen by the end of this century. This is because history has shown the acceleration of technology to be exponential, as explained in well-known works by inventors such as Ray Kurzweil and Hans Moravec, some of which are elucidated in this volume of essays. A classic example of technology acceleration is the mapping of the human genome, which achieved most of its progress in the late stages of a multi-year project that critics wrongly predicted would take decades. The rate of mapping at the end of the project was exponential compared to the beginning, due to rapid automation that has since transformed the biotechnology industry. The same may be true of molecular manufacturing (MM) as self-taught machines learn via algorithms to do things faster, better, and cheaper. I won't describe the technology of MM here because that is well covered in other essays by more competent experts. MM is important to super-intelligence because it will revolutionize the processes required to understand our own intelligence, such as neural mapping via neural probes that non-destructively map the brain. It also will accelerate three-dimensional computing, where the space between computing units is reduced and efficiency multiplied in the same way that our own brains have done it. Once this happens, the ability to mimic the human brain will accelerate, and self-aware intelligence may follow quickly. This type of acceleration suggests that Vinge's countdown to the beginning of the end of the human era must be taken seriously. The pathways by which super-human intelligence could evolve have been well explained by others and include: computer-based artificial intelligence, bioelectronic AI that develops super-intelligence on its own, or human intelligence that is accelerated or merged with AI. Such intelligence might be an enhancement of Homo sapiens, i.e. part of us, or completely separate from us, or both. Many experts argue that each of these forms of super-intelligence will enhance humans, not replace them, and although they might seem alien to unenhanced humans, they will still be an extension of us because we are the ones who designed them. The thought behind this is that we will go on as a species. Critics, however, point to a fly in that ointment. If the acceleration of computing and software continues apace, then super-intelligence, once it emerges, could outpace Homo sapiens, with or without piggybacking on human intelligence. This would see the emergence of a new species, perhaps similar in some ways, but in other ways fundamentally different from Homo sapiens in terms of intelligence, genetics, and immunology. If that happens, the gap between Homo sapiens and super-intelligence could quickly become as wide as the gap between apes and Homo sapiens. Optimists say this won't happen, because everybody will get an upgrade simultaneously when super-intelligence breaks out. Pessimists say that just a few humans or computers will acquire such intelligence first, and then use it to subjugate the rest of us Homo sapiens. For clues as to who might be right, let's look at outstanding historical examples of how we've used technology and our own immunology in relation to less technologically adept societies, and in relation to other species. When technologically superior Europeans arrived in North and South America, the indigenous populations didn't have much time to contemplate such implications because in a just few years, most who came in contact with Europeans were dead from disease. Many who died never laid eyes on a European, as death spread so quickly ahead of the conquerors through unknowing victims. Europeans at first had no idea that their own immunity to disease would give them such an advantage, but when they realized it, they did everything to use it as a weapon. They did the same with technologies that they consciously invented and knew were superior. The rapid death of these ancient civilizations, numbering in the tens of millions of persons across two continents, is not etched into the consciousness of contemporary society because those cultures left few written records and had scant time to document their own demise. Most of what they put to pictures or symbols was destroyed by religious zealots or wealth-seeking exploiters. And so, these civilizations passed quietly into history, leaving only remnants. By inference, enhanced intelligence easily could take choices about our future out of our hands, and may also be immune to hazards such as mutating viruses that pose dire threats to human society. Annihilation of Homo sapiens could occur in one of many ways: * The "oops" factor: accidental annihilation at the hands of a very smart klutz, e.g. by something that is unwittingly immune to things that kill us, or that is smart in one way, but inept in others. Predecessors to super-intelligence may only be smarter than us in some ways, and therein lies a danger. An autistic intelligence could do us in by accident. Just look at current technology, where computers are more capable than humans in some ways but hopeless in others. * Annihilation in the crossfire of a war-like competition between competing forms of super-intelligence, some of which might include upgraded Homo sapiens. One of the early, deadlier competitions could be for resources as various forms of super-intelligence gobble up space that we occupy, or remake our ecology into an environment more suitable to their needs. * Deliberate annihilation or assimilation because we are deemed inferior. If Vernor Vinge is right, we have 18 years before we will face such realities. Centuries ago, the fate of Indian civilizations in North and South America was decided in a similar time span. So the time to address such risks is now. This is especially true because paradigms shift more quickly now; therefore, when the event occurs we'll have less time, perhaps five years or even just one, to consider our options. What might we use as protection against these multi-factorial threats? Sun Microsystems' cofounder Bill Joy's April 2000 treatise, "Why the future doesn't need us,"[2] summarized one field of thought, arguing the case for relinquishment-- eschewing certain technologies due to their inherent risks. Since that time, most technology proponents have been arguing why relinquishment is impractical. They contend that the march of technology is relentless and we might as well go along for the ride, but with safeguards built in to make sure things don't get too crazy. Nonetheless, just how we build safeguards into something smarter than us, including an upgraded version of ourselves, has as yet gone unanswered. To see where the solutions might lie, let's again look at the historical perspective. If we evaluate the arguments between technology optimists and relinquishment pessimists in relation to the history of the natural world, it becomes apparent that we are stuck between a rock and a hard place. The 'rock' in this case could be an asteroid or comet. If we were to relinquish our powerful new technologies, chances are good that an asteroid would eventually collide with Earth, as has occurred before, thus throwing human civilization back to the dark ages or worse. For those who scoff at this as an astronomical long shot, be reminded that Comet Shoemaker-Levy 9 punched Earth-sized holes in Jupiter less than a decade after the space tools necessary to witness such events were launched, and just when most experts were forecasting such occurrences to be once-in-a-million-year events that we would likely never see. Or perhaps we would be thrown back by other catastrophic events that have occurred historically, such as naturally induced climate changes triggered by super-volcanos, collapse of the magnetosphere, or an all-encompassing super-nova. Due to those natural risks, I argue in my book, Our Molecular Future, that we may have no choice but to proceed with technologies that could just as easily destroy us as protect us. Unfortunately, as explained in the same book, an equally bad 'hard place' sits opposite the onrushing "rock" that threatens us. The hard place is our social ineptness. In the 21st century, despite tremendous progress, we still do amazingly stupid things. We prepare poorly for known threats including hurricanes and tsunamis. We go to war over outdated energy sources such as oil, and some of us increasingly overfeed ourselves while hundreds of millions of people ironically starve. We often value conspicuous consumption over saving impoverished human lives, as low income victims of AIDS or malaria know too well. This is an extreme understatement. A earlier recognition of the universiality of irrational institutional behavior would have prevented the error of expecting a "Nanhattan" project years ago and would have enabled the MNT aware to spend the last 20 years much more productively and with much more realistic plans. I suspect that if I grokked the depths of institutional irrationality myself I wouldn't be tempted to refer to civilization as "we". The animistic illusion that the collective has agency is not only dangerous, it is incapacitating. Michael Vassar Techno-optimists use compelling evidence to argue that we are vanquishing these shortcomings and that new technologies will overcome them completely. But one historical trend bodes against this: emergence of advanced technologies has been overwhelmingly bad for many of the less intelligent species on Earth. To cite a familiar refrain: We are massacring millions of wild animals and destroying their habitat. We keep billions more domestic farm animals under inhumane, painful, plague-breeding conditions in increasingly vast numbers. The depth and breadth of this suffering is so vast that we often ignore it, perhaps because it is too terrible to contemplate. When it gets too bothersome, we dismiss it as animal rights extremism. Some of us rationalize it by arguing that nature has always extinguished species, so we are only fulfilling that natural role. But at its core lies a searing truth: our behavior as guardians of less intelligent species, which we know feel pain and suffering, has been and continues to be atrocious. If this is our attitude toward less intelligent species, why would the attitude of superior intelligence toward us be different? It would be foolish to assume that a more advanced intelligence than our own, whether advanced in all or in only some ways, will behave benevolently toward us once it sees how we treat other species. This is completely anthropomorphic. An AI could literally be designed to treat us benevolently *for* mistreating other species and to treat us cruelly as punishment for our kindness. Admittedly, an AI designed by reverse-engineering the human brain *might* be anthropomorphic, at least at first, but if it doesn't remain so it is likely to kill us through indifference, not as judgement, and would be equally indifferent whatever our virtues. If it does remain anthropomorphic we should expect it to become the sort of being that a person would want to be, not a vindictive nightmare out of our tribal mythology. Michael Vassar We therefore must consider that a real near-term risk to our civilization is that we invent something which looks at our ways of treating less intelligent species and decides we're not worth keeping, or if we are worth keeping, we should be placed in zoos in small numbers where we can't do more harm. Resulting questions: * How do we instill into super-intelligence 'ethical' behavior that we ourselves poorly exhibit? Instilling ethical behaviors that we *do* exhibit will be fantastically difficult. Instilling behaviors that only a few of us exhibit will be little harder. Instilling behaviors that will be appropriate for situations that we have never found ourselves in will be much harder than that, and AIs will not find themselves in human situations. *We* have only the foggiest guesses as to what we would want done given historically fantastic power. That's part of why we have so much difficulty writing stories to make utopias interesting. Michael Vassar * How do we make sure that super-intelligence rejects certain unsavory practices as we banned slavery? * Can we reach into the future to prevent a super-intelligence from changing its mind about those ethics? These questions have been debated, but no broad-based consensus has emerged. Instead, as the discussions run increasingly in circles, they suggest that we as a species might be comparable to 'apes designing humans'. The ape-like ancestors of Homo sapiens had no idea they were contributing DNA to a more intelligent species. Nor could they hope to comprehend it. Likewise, can we Homo sapiens expect to comprehend what we are contributing to a super-intelligent species that follows us? As long as we continue to exercise callous neglect as guardians of species less intelligent than ourselves, it could be argued that we are much like our pre-human ancestors: incapable of consciously influencing what comes after us. The guardianship issue leads to another question: How well are we balancing technology advantages against risks? In the mere 60 years since our most powerful weapons—nuclear bombs—were invented, we've kept them mostly under wraps and congratulated ourselves for that, but we have also seen them proliferate from at first just one country to at least ten, with some of those balanced on the edge of chaos. Likewise, in the nanoscale technology world that precedes molecular manufacturing, we've begun assessing risks posed to human health by engineered nanoparticles, but those particles are already being put into our environment and into us. In other words, we are still closing the proverbial barn doors after the animals have escaped. This limited level of foresight is light years away from being able to assess how to control the onrushing risks of molecular manufacturing or of enhanced intelligence. Many accomplished experts have pointed out that the same empowerment of individuals by technologies such as the Internet and biotech could make unprecedented weapons available to small disaffected groups. Technology optimists argue that this has occurred often in history: new technologies bring new pros and cons, and after we make some awful mistakes with them, things get sorted out. However, in this case the acceleration rate by its nature puts these technologies in a class of their own, because the evidence suggests they are running ahead of our capacities to contain or balance them. Moreover, the number of violently disaffected groups in our society who could use them is substantial. To control this, do we need a "pre-crime" capacity as envisaged in the film Minority Report, where Big Brother methods are applied to anticipate crime and strike it down preemptively? The pros and cons of preemptive strikes have been well elucidated recently. The idea of giving up our freedom in order to preserve our freedom from attack by disaffected groups is being heavily debated right now, without much agreement. However, one thing seems to have been under-emphasized in these security debates: Until we do the blatantly positive things such as eliminate widespread diseases, feed the starving, house the homeless, disenfranchise dictators, stop torture, stop inhumane treatment of less intelligent species, and other do-good things that are treated today like platitudes, we will not get rid of violently disaffected groups. Furthermore, the relevant "we", e.g. the CRN task-force, has little to no prospect of exerting any postive and at least slightly nuanced influence upon the "They" who fail to do these blatantly positive things through informing them or reasoning with them. Since nuance is necessary and reason is all we have to offer, we must take our thoughts, our concerns, and our suggestions to those whe can reason, use nuance, and act effectively. To me, this strongly suggests that we find or become wealthy private individuals. Michael Vassar By doing things that are blatantly humane, (despite the efforts of despots and their extremist anti-terrorist counterparts to belittle them as wimpy) we might accomplish two things at once: greatly reduce the numbers of violently disaffected groups, and present ourselves to super-intelligence as being enlightened guardians. Otherwise, if we continue along the present path, we may someday seem to super-intelligence what our ape-like ancestors seem to us: primitive. But humans don't kill apes for being primitive. Humans kill apes because it is convenient to do so and because the people who kill them don't care about the apes. Making an AI that still cares about us once it is massively more powerful and intelligent than we are will be very difficult. Making one that doesn't have vindictive malice will be extremely easy. Vindictive malice isn't some natural property of any intelligent entity but is rather a specific adaptation that an AI built from scratch won't have and that one built using us as a model might or might not have by default but shouldn't have if it's creators are at all competent. Michael Vassar In deciding what to do about Homo sapiens, a superior form of intelligence might first evaluate our record as guardians, such as how we treat species less intelligent than ourselves, and how we treat members of our same species that are less technologically adept or just less fortunate. Why might super-intelligences look at this first? Because just as we are guardians of those less intelligent or fortunate than us, so super-intelligences will be the guardians of us and of other less intelligent species. Super-intelligences will have to decide what to do with us, and with them. If Vinge is accurate in his forecast, we don't have much time to set these things straight before someone or something superior to us makes a harsh evaluation. Being nice to dumb animals or poor people is by no means the only way of assuring survival of our species in the face of something more intelligent than us. Using technology to massively upgrade human intelligence is also a prerequisite. But that on its own may not be sufficient. Using technology to upgrade human intelligence carefully, with full understanding of the risks, and at our leisure rather than in a competitive, corner-cutting, race to the bottom *may* be a prerequisite. If we don't do that the people who upgrade first simply become the "something more intelligent" that we are endangered by. Ultimately we have to confront the REALLY difficult problem of describing a formal goal system compatible with human values. If current humans aren't smart enough to design one we will need humans who can, but to get smarter humans without encountering the very dangers associated with AI will require a radically transformed global society, one where the only competitors that the developing team must race against are infrequent natural risks, not other humans. Michael Vassar Compassion by those who possess overwhelming advantages over others is one of the special characteristics that Homo sapiens (along with a few other mammals) brings to this cold universe. It is what separates us from an asteroid or super-nova that doesn't care whether it wipes us out. Further, compassionate behavior is something most of us could agree on, and while it is often misinterpreted by some as a weakness, it is also what makes us human, and what most of us would want to contribute to future species. If that is so, then let's take the risk of being compassionate and put it into practice by launching overarching works that demonstrate the best of what we are. For example, use molecular manufacturing and its predecessor nanotechnologies to eliminate the disease of aging, instead of treating the symptoms. That is what I personally have decided to focus on, but there are many other good examples out there, including synthesized meat that eliminates inhumane treatment of billions of animals, and cheap photovoltaic electricity that could slash our dependence on oil—and end wars over it. Such works are not hard to identify. We just have to give them priority. Perhaps then we will seem less like our unwitting ancestors and more like enlightened guardians. And until we see an individual or an institution giving such works priority, and showing great wisdom and practiced nuanced rationality we should NOT bring MM to that institution's or that individual's attention. Michael Vassar End Notes 1. "The Coming Technological Singularity: How to Survive in the Post-Human Era" http://www-rohan.sdsu.edu/faculty/vinge/misc/singularity.html http://www-rohan.sdsu.edu/faculty/vinge/misc/singularity.html 2. "Why the Future Doesn't Need Us" http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/8.04/joy.html About the Author Douglas Mulhall is the author of Our Molecular Future: How Nanotechnology, Robotics, Genetics, and Artificial Intelligence Will Transform Our World, and co-author of The Calcium Bomb: The Nanobacteria Link to Heart Disease and Cancer. He managed a scientific environmental institute for several years and co-founded one of the early South American institutes devoted to recycling technology.

Safer Molecular Manufacturing Through Nanoblocks

Benj — Wed, 11 Oct 2006 22:26:58 +0000

By Tom Craver Those responsible for the safety of a nation — leaders and military and police forces — might be hard pressed to deal with a world in which any weapon or dangerous device could be manufactured in large quantities at the press of a button, at the same time that economic and social norms are being overthrown by rapid change. We can expect that — by default — authorities will want molecular manufacturing (MM) to be tightly restricted — kept out of private hands, and limited to the few nations that initially have it. That approach might provide some added security — or it might simply create such incredible pent-up demand that any barriers and restrictions are quickly overcome by black markets, intellectual property piracy, rogue-nation programs to duplicate MM, etc. This essay attempts to chart a middle path for the early years of MM availability — one that allows most of the benefits of MM to be widely available to all individuals and nations, while maintaining some control over key elements. I will not go into who will hold that control, other than to suggest the obvious — that those nations that hold the reins of world power are likely to exercise it to retain power, by delegating it in a controlled fashion to cooperative nations and subordinate authorities. It is not the objective of this essay to look at radical social changes that might arise due to molecular manufacturing, but rather to see how well MM can fit with existing forms. DEFINITIONS Atom Precise - each atom and bond between atoms in an object is as planned in a design. Also used to describe the process or capability of making atom precise objects. Nanoblocks - atom precise constructs with size on the order of 100 nanometers that can be mechanically connected to form larger objects. Each nanoblock would have one or more functions — as simple as providing physical strength and support, or as complex as digital computation and communication. Fabber - a device that automatically assembles individual products for human use. In the context of this essay, it will refer to a device that constructs products out of nanoblocks, specifically excluding atom precise nanofactories - those which build products directly atom-by-atom. TECHNICAL ADVANTAGES OF USING NANOBLOCKS Nanoblock-based fabbers will have a number of technical advantages over direct atom precise molecular manufacturing. Even their disadvantages (less precision, lower strength in products) can be considered advantages for purposes of security. Standardization of nanoblocks — their modes of interconnection and interaction, their functions, and so on — can greatly simplify the process of designing atom precise products. Use of nanoblocks raises the level of design above the point that requires deep understanding of nanoscale physics and chemistry, to the point where anyone could use automated software tools to design simple but useful products, and expert engineers could reasonably design extremely complex and capable products. For example, there would be no need to re-design a nanoscale computer out of individual atoms every time one wished to incorporate information processing into a product, or to re-invent means of digital communication throughout a product. While the amount of energy expended to form a single atom-to-atom bond and the waste heat generated is tiny, the number of atoms and bonds in a typical finished product for human use is so large that energy and heat issues will be non-trivial when constructing human-scale products. The energy used and heat released to build things out of nanoblocks should be orders of magnitude smaller, as most of the energy is consumed and heat released in the process of making the nanoblocks. Energy supply and heat removal will be much easier for nanoblock fabbers, allowing them to be more compact and operate much faster — though, of course, they still will need a supply of "raw materials" — a store of nanoblocks rather than whatever atomic or molecular feedstock atom precise nanofactories may use. The nanoblocks needed by a fabber could be made in advance. Energy consumption and heat dissipation would be spread over time, with nanoblocks being stored in the fabber for later quick construction of finished products. Alternatively, nanoblocks could be produced in bulk by centralized nanofactories near convenient energy supplies, to be distributed and sold to owners of fabbers. The energy required to ship a kilogram of nanoblocks, even halfway around the world, should be a fraction of the energy required to produce them. It should be possible to design nanoblocks to allow controlled disassembly — i.e. recycling of products made out of reusable nanoblocks. Each nanoblock could have an ID embedded that specifies its type — reliably sorting nanoblocks would be far more efficient than sorting atoms. This would mean that the energy that goes into producing them would not be wasted when one no longer needs or wants the product they compose. Instead, the unwanted object could be taken apart, and the nanoblocks sorted for re-use in making new objects. This would save energy and avoid the massive production of junk that could result from large-scale use of inexpensive manufacturing. A related concept — utility fog — would be a programmable substance consisting of "foglets." Each foglet would be a tiny simple robot, able to interact with vast numbers of other foglets to form nearly any shape imaginable, including objects that are able to move and react to human beings. One might be able to re-create the Star Trek "holodeck" using foglets — an environment in which almost anything becomes possible. The flexibility that makes this idea attractive also creates the risk that the utility fog might be infected with an information virus designed to take it over for malicious purposes, harming or killing or simply trapping a human in the utility fog environment. The fixed-function approach of building things out of nanoblocks and recycling things when they are no longer needed seems safer, at least for the early days of molecular manufacturing. FABBER SAFETY AND SECURITY ISSUES The use of nanoblocks creates opportunities to make molecular manufacturing safer. With a careful selection of the types of nanoblocks made available, a fabber should not be able to build an atom precise nanofactory out of nanoblocks, nor devices that will be a significant help in any attempt to "bootstrap" production of an atom precise nanofactory, reducing the risk of proliferation of atom precise MM to "rogue nations" or terrorists. A nanoblock-only fabber (i.e. one which cannot produce its own nanoblocks, and so requires a supply of nanoblocks as input) could be distributed world-wide without releasing atom precise MM to everyone, avoiding any risk that anyone could start using it to produce massive quantities of dangerous products out of freely available atoms. Yet it would allow construction of almost as wide a range of products as an atom precise nanofactory, for not much more cost — reducing demand for atom precise MM. There would be products that could not be made out of nanoblocks, of course — such as nanoblocks themselves. This fact could give official security forces with access to atom precise nanofactories an advantage, as weapons and systems made with atom precise nanofactories will be somewhat more capable than any created using nanoblock fabbers. Products of commercial or security value that cannot be made out of nanoblocks and require atom precise assembly could be made in centralized plants where security measures could be taken. One simple security measure would be to have such products made by dedicated function nanofactories, with the design built in at the lowest level and unable to be altered without destroying the nanofactory. These dedicated function nanofactories would be produced using general-purpose programmable nanofactories in a few extremely high security plants. THE RISK OF EXPONENTIAL SELF-REPLICATION Anyone familiar with the "grey goo" exponential self-replication scenario might ask whether a device made of nanoblocks might disassemble objects made of recyclable nanoblocks and re-use those nanoblocks to produce copies of the device — a "lumpy goo" scenario. To prevent this, one solution would be to design nanoblocks to require use of a key-like manipulator — too small to be made of or emulated by nanoblocks — to lock blocks together in order to fabricate objects. So long as the key-like manipulator is only built into fabbers, and never made part of or attached to a commonly available nanoblock, only fabbers will be able to build things from those nanoblocks — eliminating much of the potential to build a malicious self-replicator out of nanoblocks. The same key would be required to disassemble objects for recycling — preventing malicious disassembly of objects made of nanoblocks, outside of dedicated recycling devices. One could object that preventing the fabber from making copies of itself would eliminate a potentially major advantage. A fabber that can make copies of itself could be distributed very rapidly, creating a huge market for nanoblocks and nanoblock-based designs in a very short period of time. That should be a significant advantage for a manufacturer willing to give up income from the fabber and focus on selling nanoblocks. So long as the nanoblocks were non-reusable, the risk of exponential self-replication would be minimized - and the manufacturer could expect their fabber to become a universal standard before competitors got to market, making their nanoblock business quite profitable. However, other companies would very quickly begin producing reverse-engineered "clone" and improved nanoblocks, cutting into the original manufacturer's revenues. It would likely not be long before someone offered re-usable nanoblocks, opening the way to exponentially self-replicating systems. Given the value of recyclable nanoblocks for energy and cost savings and convenient disposal, and the security risks of self-copying fabber components, it seems wisest to allow recyclable nanoblocks but prohibit fabbers that can self-copy. Very likely the cost of fabbers will fall rapidly in any case, since they would themselves be made with atom precise MM. The above assumes a relatively free market in fabber and nanoblock designs. That may not be the case if the government is involved and sets a single standard that all manufacturers must follow. In that case, one might see a "utility" model, where nanoblock prices are controlled to allow manufacturers a "reasonable" profit. This scenario would be likely to slow innovation - but of course that might be exactly the effect desired by the government. Non-self-copying fabbers with recyclable nanoblocks seem the most likely choice in such a standard. LIMITING OTHER POTENTIAL ABUSES Fabbers will very likely be targeted with the equivalent of computer viruses — malware designs that will attempt to infect fabbers and transmit copies of themselves, and probably use the fabber to produce something annoying or dangerous. The greatest danger would be if fabbers were connected directly to the Internet, allowing very rapid spread of such a virus without human intervention. One way to fight this would be to keep all fabbers "offline" — designed to only allow loading new designs by manually transferring a design on a physically separate storage medium. This should slow the spread of malware down to human speeds, allowing humans a chance to become aware of the problem and deal with it. It may prove useful to establish a program that allows anyone with an interest in "clever fabber hacks" or atom precise molecular manufacturing to exercise their curiosity in a safe, controlled environment. This would help reduce the incidence of 'experiments' analogous to releasing computer viruses and worms into the wild, by giving hackers an alternative and encouraging environment. Their creative - or potentially destructive - ideas could benefit society or help plan defenses against potential dangers. It also provides an opportunity to catch the few who are going down the wrong path and turn them around - or at least know who they are if they seem inclined to persist in dangerous pursuits. Malicious users could produce dangerous or otherwise undesirable nanoblock-based products. For example, a murderer might create a knife, kill someone, and disassemble the evidence. Or perhaps create a household robot - but program it to wreak havoc. Defenses against such abuses should be taken into consideration. There are several approaches that might be helpful. Since recyclable nanoblocks would have a readable type-ID built in, it would be trivial to extend that to a unique ID, making it possible to backtrack the source of an otherwise anonymous malicious automated device, or obtain a clue from nanoblocks torn off a more mundane object such as a knife. With users knowing this, fewer will seriously contemplate engaging in malicious production. LIFE WITH FABBERS The use of nanoblock-limited fabbers (i.e., those which cannot make their own nanoblocks) has some likely implications for society. Certainly costs of many material goods should fall, raising the standard of living of many people around the world. If instead, self-copying fabbers and non-recyclable nanoblocks are available, benefits for less developed nations may arrive a bit sooner, but the need to continually buy more nanoblocks will limit their long term impact. Some visions of life with atom precise MM have people going "off the grid" — quitting their jobs, setting up independent solar powered homesteads, and ending capitalism and perhaps economics as we know them. That scenario would be very unlikely with non-recyclable nanoblocks, and limited with recyclable nanoblocks, as people would still need to engage in productive economic activity in order to have money to buy replacement nanoblocks. With most jobs in manufacturing and distribution eliminated, people would largely find jobs in the service sector. Service jobs will shift even more to specialization, due to increased competition. Developed nations have already gone far in this direction, and other nations will likely be forced to follow suit. This will be a difficult transition for nations that have only recently begun developing and have been heavily dependent upon manufacturing for export — services will be more difficult to export, and local consumers may not be as used to consuming services. Another common vision of life after the arrival of atom precise MM has a tension between free "open source" designs and commercially available designs. The greater ease of designing with nanoblocks instead of atoms would likely give the open source approach extra impetus. Still, there will also be a fair number of things that people will not trust to be made from nanoblocks, and conventional commerce in those products will continue. Also, as always, there will be elements of style and usage that will cause people to pay for things even though free alternatives are available, just as people today will pay more for a real Rolex™ than a fake, or pay for a commonly used operating system even though free operating systems are available. With so many choices, and so many people seeking employment in services, it seems likely that many stores will focus on personal service and product advice. Goods purchased in a shop will be priced based on a combination of service and the prestige of certain designers, with a very small component of the cost of the nanoblocks used in product construction. There still will be "big chain" stores with vast showrooms filled with goods, but even there, the key will be the service of providing one place to go see and compare a huge variety of goods. They may make some goods while you wait, others they'll have available off the shelf, still others — especially larger goods — they'll make and deliver to your home. Likely there will also be a way to buy "limited uses" designs for home production. CONCLUSIONS Making nanoblock-limited fabbers available to everyone promises to provide most of the easily imaginable benefits of unrestricted atom precise MM, with significantly fewer risks. Fabbers can provide useful advantages of speed, efficiency, and safety. Certainly, they are not a cure-all, creating a perfect utopia — but the problems remaining may be humanly manageable. Perhaps fabbers would only be a transition phase before a shift to a more liberal availability of atom precise MM, but given all the risks and uncertainties raised by molecular manufacturing, this more controlled introduction seems warranted. The most likely alternative is not free release of atom precise MM, but even tighter restrictions. Fabbers limited to constructing things out of nanoblocks seem like a reasonable compromise approach, and one that government authorities and others may consider acceptable. About the Author Tom Craver has been fascinated by the implications of molecular manufacturing (and impatiently waiting for it) for two decades. His writings have appeared mostly on the Internet and in "NanoTechnology Magazine". As a senior software engineer at Intel Corporation, Tom analyzes and tunes the performance of video codec software for near-future microprocessors. He holds a Master of Science from Purdue University, and has been granted seven patents.

Molecular Manufacturing and the Need for Crime Science

Benj — Wed, 11 Oct 2006 22:23:49 +0000

By Deborah Osborne The anticipated emergence of molecular manufacturing (MM) within decades requires new conceptualizations about crime and new strategies to address it. The seeds of possible solutions are planted in the United Kingdom where formal policing began. These seeds are called “crime science.”[1] Early policing stressed that the principal duty of police was to prevent crime rather than detect it.[2] Crime science focuses on using science in creative and unprecedented ways to prevent crime. What type of crime will occur in a world with MM? If the terrorist activities of this decade so far are indicators, it is likely that fundamentalist reactions to science will result in terrorist acts against scientists who threaten world order as we know it. This alone is cause for examining how we might prevent crime, as preventing crime is similar to preventing terrorism. Since much of the crime of the future will be enabled by new technology, it will be necessary to develop strategies to prevent the abuse of technology. We use little science in policing strategies today, despite the enormous progress in technology in the past century. Tools have improved, but advanced strategies are rare. We use police cars instead of horse and buggies; citizens call 911 from cell phones and officers come running to almost every single request for police help; we have better weapons, better communications, and better transportation. Most of the time, however, we do not assess why police keep running to the same locations and dealing with the same problems. Too often today, we look at crime incident by incident. In medicine, this would be like studying each individual virus case separately to find a way to combat that one particular infection. Finding practical ways to prevent, contain, and minimize crime by studying it in aggregations—as research scientists study strains of viruses—with objective measures and creative solutions: this is what policing in the world of the future will demand. Only the most progressive agencies, very few in number, have a grasp of how to maximize the wealth of information made accessible by technology, to turn it into a resource for better policing. The status of information technology in the United States is a disaster, not only on the federal level (in the FBI), but also in most local law enforcement agencies—the first responders to crime and to terrorism.[3] Fear of Big Brother and of losing civil liberties is not unreasonable, considering the capacity of existing technologies to monitor people. However, at least in policing, we are moving toward a more transparent society.[4] (The ability to track officers with GPS, and the ubiquitous surveillance cameras on police cars are examples of transparency in police work.) That said, the truth is that very little analysis of information on repeat offenders, on crime hot spots, on serial crimes—the very things the police are charged with knowing—exists today. In many cases, we do not need more intelligence or secret information to prevent crime and arrest dangerous offenders. We just need to learn how to analyze the information we already have. In a world with molecular manufacturing, more information will become available in real time; thus, the capacity to create actionable information will grow, but its utility will benefit society only if the police know how to maximize information as a resource. Because of the mystique and mythology surrounding police, as reflected on television and in movies, the ability of civilians to question police work is impaired. They believe the media version of how to be a good cop. The good cop always gets the bad guy, and this may be the mindset of most people for the post-MM world: who will be the enemies, and how can we defeat them? But perhaps these are the wrong questions. Recently, at a national focus group in Washington on intelligence and crime analysis, Dr. Jerry Ratcliffe[5] cited a study showing that out of every 1000 crime occurrences (including the one-quarter of these that go unreported), only four persons are convicted of a crime. Even if this figure is not reliable across all policing jurisdictions, the reality is that our entire criminal justice system depends on catching a few bad people and locking them up rather than researching and funding measures to reduce the opportunities or motivations to commit crime. How can crime science make a difference? Why does molecular manufacturing make it even more important? Three core premises change the paradigm of “fighting crime.” The first premise is that criminal behavior and disorder are much more common than we realize, and that offenders are often very similar to you and me – in fact, they sometimes are you and me. How often have you gone over the speed limit? When you were a teen, did you break minor laws? The moral outrage at crime usually is reserved for the “other,” the person who is not you. Crime science acknowledges habitual offenders and studies ways to prevent their crimes (as well as identifying those who should be fully prosecuted because of recidivist behavior). However, it also opens the curtain to reveal that crime is not always a battle of good against bad. MM in the hands of “good” people still may result in crime. Acknowledgement of the potential “shadow" in each of us is a best practice when developing MM. While not something stressed in the emerging field of crime science, it is a view supported by Carl Jung. Unfortunately, there can be no doubt that man is, on the whole, less good than he imagines himself or wants to be. Everyone carries a shadow, and the less it is embodied in the individual's conscious life, the blacker and denser it is. If an inferiority is conscious, one always has a chance to correct it. Furthermore, it is constantly in contact with other interests, so that it is continually subjected to modifications. But if it is repressed and isolated from consciousness, it never gets corrected.[6] The second premise in crime science is that crime occurs where there is opportunity, and that opportunity itself can be a cause of crime. Using a system approach to problem solving, designing MM with built in crime prevention elements would be a best practice. [7] The third premise is that existing criminal justice systems will never be good enough to deal with modern crime opportunities—and MM will certainly prove this premise correct. [8] Although there are multitudes of criminal justice and criminology degree programs, little focus has been placed on the scientific study of crime prevention in universities and colleges. Those academics that have chosen to focus on this area often are marginalized by their peers. Obviously, because of the severity of the dangers posed by MM, preventing criminal activities is optimal when compared to reacting to their consequences. Academia must respond to this urgent need to bring a multiple-disciplinary approach to crime prevention, incorporating all the various sciences to this task. A serious examination of the efficiency and effectiveness of our current systems of policing, courts, and studies is necessary prior to the arrival of MM. This should lead to subsequent major reforms, dynamic in nature to adapt to a rapidly changing world. Who will be policing the world when MM comes to be? Who do you want to be policing this world? How do you want it policed? In 2002, in the United States, police and detectives held 840,000 jobs and approximately 81% (680,400) were local-level law enforcers.[9] According the International Association of Chiefs of Police, based on facts from the Bureau of Justice Statistics, only 9% of local-level law enforcement agencies required their officers to have an associate’s degree, and only 2% required them to have a bachelor’s degree.[10] Molecular manufacturing means we need to create a much better educated police force. MM means we need to think in terms of built-in crime preventative measures—the prevention of opportunity for crime. MM means we need to rethink the emphasis on individual justice and begin a sincere quest to bring science beyond the thin blue line, before it is too late. End Notes 1. http://www.jdi.ucl.ac.uk/ 2. http://www.met.police.uk/history/peel.htm 3. http://www.infoworld.com/article/05/03/21/12FEfbi_1.html 4. Brin, David (1998) The Transparent Society: Will Technology Force Us to Choose Between Privacy and Freedom? (Perseus Books Group)
5. http://jratcliffe.net/ 6. Jung, Carl, “Psychology and Religion" (1938). In CW 11: Psychology and Religion: West and East. P.131 7. http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/prgpdfs/fprs98.pdf 8. http://www.jdi.ucl.ac.uk/downloads/crime_science_series/pdf/LAUNCHING_CS_FINAL.pdf 9. http://www.bls.gov/oco/oco/160.htm
10. http://www.theiacp.org/faq.htm About the Author Deborah Osborne, crime analyst and book author, was a remote Research Fellow for the Center for Strategic Intelligence Research at the Joint Military Intelligence College, Defense Intelligence Agency, 2004-2005. She holds a BA in Psychology and an MA in Social Policy from Empire State College, SUNY.

Considering Military and Ethical Implications of Nanofactory-Level Nanotechnology

Benj — Wed, 11 Oct 2006 22:16:45 +0000

By Brian Wang This essay looks at some existing trends in military capability and technology development, and considers the impact of nanofactory-level nanotechnology (NN). A nanofactory[1] is a proposed manufacturing system that could be built if molecularly precise manufacturing technology is developed. Current projections indicate that a nanofactory should be able to fabricate its own mass of advanced products—including duplicate nanofactories—in just a few hours. Assumptions of This Essay The development of a nanofactory seems to be between five and fifteen years in the future. If there is a secret nanofactory development program, then nanofactories might be produced at an earlier date. The impact of an introduction of nanofactory capabilities will be considered for the 2011 to 2025 timeframe. Artificial intelligence with human or better performance across a broad range of functions could in theory speed development of nanotechnology, but this is assumed to come after the nanofactory, because it is assumed that nanofactory-level technology likely would be needed to successfully reverse engineer the human brain. Safe Leads, and Who Will Get It First Any non-US developer of a nanofactory will have to either develop systems that overcome the current US lead in conventional and non-conventional capabilities, or develop new tactics that circumvent those capabilities. However, NN could make large amounts of current weapons systems obsolete. For the US, superiority would have to be maintained by pressing ahead with nanotechnology development, because former advantages may no longer be decisive. Although game-changing shifts in military technology advantage are historically infrequent, the costs and required base of technology for developing NN are widely available in the world. It is not assured that any one country will reach game-changing capabilities first. Also, nanofactories are not a finish line for technology. Nanofactories could massively accelerate the pace of research and development.[2] Precise designs could be produced and tested in hours. The cost of production will be almost equal to the cost of generating a prototype. Currently the United States spends billions of dollars and takes about five years to create one prototype of a new fighter jet. In the first months of the project, there are multiple detailed fighter jet proposals, which are then reduced to the compromise that is developed. In the age of nanofactories, multiple design teams with superior computer assistance could generate many more detailed proposals, and all of them could be built for little additional cost and effort and compared in competitive showdowns. This change in the rate of development will enable leapfrogging shifts in capabilities. Some Existing and Expected Capabilities by 2025 The following is a summary of existing and expected technology. Many people do not fully understand the power of current technology or the pace of technological progress. Military technology, surveillance, computers, and other technology are already very powerful and becoming more powerful. The capabilities listed in this section, which are projected to exist in the 2011-2025 timeframe, are those that currently are being funded and appear likely to be successful. Precision-guided munitions provide one of the most important existing capabilities.[3] Precision munitions lets the military destroy whatever can be identified as an important target. This places importance on airspace domination to allow the munitions to be delivered. Accurate military intelligence and electronic sensing are needed to identify and locate targets in real-time. In World War II, an average of 9,000 bombs were needed to destroy a specific target; now it usually takes only one or two. A month-long mission that used to require 30 sorties with 100 planes can now be accomplished with a cruise missile fired from 1,500 miles away, and the target will be destroyed in three hours. The United States has a $2 billion UAV (unmanned aerial vehicle) annual budget[4] and possesses a large and increasingly wide variety of UAVs. Some are as small as insects, but they can be as large as supersonic fighters and bombers. Unmanned aerial vehicles will enable their users to conduct more capable and flexible military operations that do not have the political risk of loss of military personal. The trend towards unmanned military vehicles also is progressing in ground vehicles. Standard computers should continue to follow Moore’s law[5] for improvement and would be about 1,000 times more powerful than today by 2020. The potential developments can be summarized as a ten times increase in capability in most military systems and a 1,000 times increase in computing capability. Production Revolution and Product Performance in the Age of Nanotechnology One product of a nanofactory is another nanofactory (though security restrictions may limit this capability in deployed versions). This enables exponential manufacturing. The first tiny lab-built device can be made to build a system with two integrated devices, which can work in parallel to build four, and in just a few months can build a full-sized nanofactory. Less than a month after that, millions of nanofactories could produce thousands of tons of products (including more nanofactories) per hour. Products of nanofactories will be high performance: small precise machines are more powerful than large ones--perhaps a million times more powerful, when shrunk to the nanoscale--and precise materials may be a hundred times stronger than today’s best. Nanofactories will be capable of general-purpose manufacturing: because structures will be made additively from tiny precise building blocks under automated control, simply changing the program (blueprint) will change the product. A wide range of components and products will be possible, including computers, sensors, motors, and displays. Automated nanofactories will reduce direct manufacturing costs drastically. Carbon-based feedstocks are inexpensive. Services, design work, and intellectual capital costs would become the main drivers of overall costs and pricing. Nanofactory-level nanotechnology would bring 100 to 1,000,000-fold increases in militarily relevant capabilities. Systems could become both cheaper and more functional, to an extent that would make a game-changing difference. Sufficiently advanced systems could have an overwhelming advantage over less advanced systems; for example, an essentially unlimited manufacturing capacity combined with fully automated battlefield weapons implies near-certain destruction of all soldier-based forces. Surveillance and Data Mining from Now into the Age of Nanotechnology Nanofactories will make computers millions of times faster and more powerful than traditional computers. What can you get with this capability? ECHELON[6] is a highly secretive world-wide signals intelligence and analysis network run by the UKUSA Community. It is estimated to intercept 3 billion communications per day. A similar nanotechnology-enhanced system would be able to intercept many more messages and perform more detailed analysis on the messages. Ten times more capability could be obtained for 100,000 times less money. Instead of a single billion-dollar project producing one machine, there could be thousands of $10,000 Echelon workstations and even $100 portable Echelons. Such a powerful state-run surveillance capability could profoundly impact civil rights. Smart dust[7] is a hypothetical network of tiny wireless microelectromechanical sensors (MEMS), robots, or other devices installed with wireless communications, that can detect anything from light and temperature to vibrations. Work on smart dust is ongoing at the University of California. Nanofactory-level nanotechnology would enable smart dust that is orders of magnitude more compact and with vastly improved functionality.[8] The improved sensing ability of nanotechnology-enabled smart dust and nanotechnology-enabled UAVs will revolutionize the military ability to identify and locate valuable opposing assets in real time. An arms race to make stealthy smart dust, smart dust detectors, and smart dust hunter-killers may be inevitable. One thousand times cheaper smart dust of similar capability would be the expectation from Moore’s law. Today, a smart dust device costs about five dollars and has 32,000 bytes of memory. In 2025, standard advancement would provide the same device for half a cent. Four hundred million smart dust devices, one for every person in the United States, would cost just $20 million. Each device could record 80 bytes of information every day for a year. Nanofactories could increase capabilities by a million times beyond that. The gain could be split between lower cost and higher performance: devices could be a thousand times cheaper and a thousand times more capable. The same $20 million referred to above could buy 400 billion devices. These could be distributed: two on each person in the world, eight for different locations that the person goes to or vehicles in which they travel, and 40 on different objects or animals that they possess. The improved devices would have 32 MB of memory and correspondingly more processing power and sensors. They could record video, audio, biosensors, and use better processing to discard redundant information. Information could be pooled to know which objects and people are together at different times. The history of any object or person could be tracked. Who and what were you with? What were you saying? How were your heart rate and blood pressure? Your mood? Your facial expressions and gestures? What was the weather? Did you have your dog, your wallet, your car keys, a gun hidden in your clothes? Did you swallow a balloon filled with contraband? Detailed records of 1600 bytes could be recorded every half hour for a year or every six seconds for a day. Nano-enhanced smart dust also could be weaponized. A person who offended any of the 100 different groups using smart dust to track them could be killed when the smart dust was activated to release a toxin. Even without nano, a future smart dust could have this capability, but the nano-version would be some combination of cheaper, more flexible, and more capable. This could enable those that control the smart dust to eliminate or control exactly whom they want under precise parameters. This could be part of a system of super-oppression. Destroying the World in the Age of Nanotechnology: Offense is Stronger A 100kg nanofactory-built combat drone could be supersonic[9] and have the destructive capability of a modern fighter jet. Nanofactories could produce billions of these drones in a few months. Several could be targeted at every person on the opposing side of a military conflict. Genocide will become cheaper and easier. Image processing and sensors could also allow a more selective targeting. It appears that offensive military capabilities will improve faster than defensive capabilities, especially since nanofactories would revolutionize access to space and the ability to utilize space-based resources.[10] Nanofactory-built launch systems with widespread use of diamond and carbon nanotube material would enable $1-10/kg launch costs by reducing the mass and construction cost of vehicle and systems.[11] Nanofactories could create space vehicles with ion drives with 739 kWe/kg specific power, 1000 km/s ideal exhaust velocity vehicle and 9.8 m/s2 acceleration. This would be an early capability provided by enhancing current designs with better materials and molecularly precise construction. The enhanced space systems that nanofactories can create will provide ease of movement in and around the solar system. For military purposes, space vehicles could divert and accelerate asteroids and comets at the earth and other targets. These vehicles could position themselves near a space rock (1,000,000 tons+) for months or years and divert large ones that would have passed near the earth so that they impact the earth. Even dinosaur killer comets could be diverted.[12] This comet diverting capability would have physics that are orders of magnitude in the attacker’s favor. It could be used as a second strike[13] capability for mutually assured world destroying capability. The defender would need a comet shield[14] that works even if there are intelligent forces actively working to make the defense fail. Most plans for comet defense depend on detecting a comet that will hit the earth early enough to nudge it out of the way. Second strike crews deliberately nudging whatever they can onto earth collision courses would makes defense a lot more difficult. Attackers with space rocks have a huge advantage. Large-scale space bombardment with large objects could be considered a doomsday response. This could actually be stabilizing: if certain powers have doomsday options, their enemies might back off from attempting to wipe them out. This does not address small-scale conflicts that do not trigger a doomsday response. It is unclear whether smaller incoming objects could be deflected or destroyed; objects too small will be destroyed in the high atmosphere, and it may not be possible to accelerate intermediate-sized objects to sufficient speed to evade destruction. If intermediate-scale space bombardment turns out to be a feasible offensive technology, it could deliver energies comparable to thermonuclear warheads. Nations and alliances either possessing or on a path to develop significant space programs are the United States, China, Europe, Japan, Russia and India. Nanofactories would greatly enhance space capabilities. On Deterrence The maximum deterrence you can have is the ability to kill all of your enemies and destroy everything they care about. (Enemies who do not care about dying may not be deterred even by this.) Deterrence does not require this ultimate level of harm; deterrence of a rational opponent requires only being able to cause more damage to them than they gain from attacking you. China has relied upon that level of deterrent for the last 30 years. Useful discussions of deterrence levels can be found at various websites.[15] Being weaker than an opponent that is evil can be a very dangerous position. A surprisingly small advantage can be exploited for genocide. The Hutus, armed with machetes and guns, killed 937,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus. However, an imbalance of power does not mean that war or genocide is inevitable. Once side or the other will always have an advantage. Motivation is a key determiner of conflict, and as described in the following section, advanced nanotechnology can reduce incentives for war. Deterrence may not work if one side miscalculates the effectiveness of the deterrence of the other side. If an aggressor underestimates an opponent’s defenses or willingness to resist, they could mistakenly start a more costly conflict than intended. More accurate knowledge may prevent such miscalculation between rational opponents. However, a strategy of providing misinformation and confusing information could be followed by a weaker power to confuse an opponent who needs good information and a clearer cost benefit calculation before acting. Ethics, Shifting Motivations, and Rational Calculations in the Age of Nanotechnology The powerful technologies that are being developed could rapidly shift military balances of power. Nations cannot assume that their existing weapons inventory provides assured security. A lead in current technology, even current nanotechnologies, does not guarantee a lead with molecular manufacturing. The future balance of power will be determined by a nation's level of development with advanced nanotechnology, as well as space capabilities and other new technologies that will be augmented by nanofactory technology. Nations without a molecular manufacturing capability will be at the mercy of opponents with the technology. Nanotechnology can shift the motivations and rational calculation for war. For example, if nanotechnology makes a nation’s economy grow at 24% per year, then in three years that nation will have twice as much stuff; they would have less incentive to attack an equal size opponent and try to take their stuff. Attacking an opponent brings in elements of risk and costs. With such large gains in the near future, rational groups should not want or need to engage in violent conflict for economic gain. Other differences between groups that lead to conflict need to be addressed to prevent violent conflict. Genocide and super-oppression become technically easier with nanotechnology. Therefore, it is more important than ever for all people to work together toward peaceful resolution of differences and to keep those who would try to initiate atrocities in check. The economic bounty and other benefits[16] that nanotechnology could provide should be used by farsighted nations to reduce the motivations for conflict. End Notes 1. Phoenix, Chris (2003) “Design of a Primitive Nanofactory” http://www.jetpress.org/volume13/Nanofactory.htm 2. Phoenix, Chris (2005) “Fast Development of Nano-Manufactured Products” http://crnano.org/essays05.htm#7,July 3. Hallion, Richard P. (1995) “Precision Guided Munitions and the New Era of Warfare” http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/smart/docs/paper53.htm 4. http://www.military.com/features/0,15240,87318,00.html, The FY-07 budget request includes $1.7 billion for UAV buys and research programs and $9.9 billion between FY-08 and FY-11. 5. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moore%27s_law, “Moore's Law” is about the empirical observation that, at the rate of technological development, the complexity of an integrated circuit, with respect to minimum component cost, will double about every 18 months. 6. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ECHELON,http://cryptome.org/echelon-nh.htm, ECHELON is a highly secretive worldwide signals intelligence and analysis network run by the UKUSA Community. ECHELON can capture radio and satellite communications, telephone calls, faxes and e-mails nearly anywhere in the world and includes computer automated analysis and sorting of intercepts. ECHELON is estimated to intercept up to three billion communications every day. 7. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Smart_dust 8. “Sensor networks for Dummies” MIT Technology Review, March 17, 2006 http://www.technologyreview.com/InfoTech/wtr_16607,300,p1.html 9. http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/06038/651627.stm, One small step for drones: Lockheed leaps into unmanned plane market, Feb 2006. Falcon, a conceptual drone bomber that would fly at Mach 9 near the edge of the atmosphere. 10. McKendree, T. L (2001) “A Technical and Operational Assessment of Molecular Nanotechnology for Space Operations,” Ph.D. Dissertation, Industrial and Systems Engineering Dept., University of Southern California 11. http://www.zyvex.com/nanotech/nano4/mckendreePaper.html, Implications of Molecular Nanotechnology Technical Performance Parameters on Previously Defined Space System Architectures 12. Hammerschlag, Michael “It’s the End of the World as We Know It” http://members.surfbest.net/mikehammer/endword2.htm 13. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_strike, In nuclear strategy, second strike capability is a country's assured ability to respond to a nuclear attack with powerful nuclear retaliation against the attacker. 14. http://spacewatch.lpl.arizona.edu/faq.html , http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asteroid_deflection_strategies 15.http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Nuclear_strategies 16. Center for Responsible Nanotechnology (2003) “Benefits of Molecular Manufacturing” http://www.crnano.org/benefits.htm About the Author Brian Wang has a degree in computer science and an MBA and has worked in the information technology industry for 20 years. He created and ran his own professional services computer consulting company with offices in Canada and the United States, and with clients in the USA and Europe. In addition to being a CRN Task Force participant, Brian has been a Foresight Nanotechnology Institute senior associate since 1997. He is also on the advisory board of the Nanoethics Group.

Molecular Manufacturing and the Developing World: Looking to Nanotechnology for Answers

Benj — Wed, 11 Oct 2006 22:05:27 +0000

By Don Maclurcan[i] Despite limited literature discussing the global implications of molecular manufacturing (MM), the seeds for certain key debates are starting to be sown. They essentially mirror those presented for current and near-term nanotechnology[ii]: for what purposes will the technology be developed and used, by whom will it be created and owned, what is the nature of the risks it will bring, and what kind of impact will it have upon the global economy and developing world? The realisation of MM’s central goals[iii] would undoubtedly lead to the most concentrated technological ‘tsunami’ ever witnessed. The unpredictable nature of such a revolution makes answering the previous questions all the more difficult. However, just as biotechnology is commonly used as a yardstick for nanotechnology evaluations (given the continuity of many social concerns and relationship between existing biotechnology capabilities and potential to develop nanotechnology [2]), we argue here that the best way to set up the MM debate, in terms of its impact on developing countries, may be to look at developments and trends in nanotechnology. Central to such analysis is addressing the ways in which nanotechnology creates new possibilities for developing countries in terms of access to technology, potential benefits, risks, and shifting views of science and technology, as well as the imposing of new demands in terms of infrastructure and approaches to science. While many of the issues MM faces may be similar to those presently developing with nanotechnology, MM offers a revolution of a starkly different magnitude. However, MM still faces an ‘identity crisis’ in the developed world, and an ‘identity absence’ in the developing world. This has been further hampered by authors and academics who, in writing articles and papers concerning nanotechnology’s impact upon the developing world, mix the two terms and confuse references to the relevant potential impacts [3]. Coupled with hype surrounding ‘grey goo’, a poor foundation for international discussions in which to include MM has evolved. There need to be consistent efforts by those writing in the area to distinguish the kind of nanotechnology to which they are referring. However, while the scope of potential impact differs greatly between nanotechnology and MM, history suggests there will be universal patterns in terms of its distribution. Whether MM is developed to either a limited or a full capacity, it is more than likely the majority of the world will never reap its benefits and perhaps even fewer will know or understand its potential. The location of MM’s initial development will play a key role in the resolution of suggestions that MM will increase global corporate control [4], eradicate natural resource markets to the detriment of developing countries [4, 5] or reduce global inequalities and allow countries to ‘leap-frog’ the industrial revolution [1]. Some suggest that industrialised countries are more fertile ground for its development [6], while others believe China and India are in a more likely position than the United States of America and European Union to be the initial producers[iv] [7]. However, as McCarthy notes, “just possessing the technology does not mean that a given state will be able to use it to full advantage” [6]. Countries will require an ability to integrate and respond to MM in order to exploit its potential. In more recent times, debates have extended to consider MM’s initial development by both small and big research groups, within private and public spheres, by structured and unstructured research groups, as well as by ‘rogue’ and ‘peaceful’ nations. Assessing nanotechnology, we notice an increasing ‘nano-divide’ in terms of national research levels and funding, as much amongst the developing countries themselves as between the developed and the developing world [8]. This highlights the limitations of discussing the developing world as if it was an homogeneous grouping. Emerging technology affects regions, countries, populations and communities in vastly disparate ways. Already, 62 countries are engaging with nanotechnology on a national level. Nineteen of them are classified as ‘developing’ but none of these are from the group of countries classified as ‘least developed’. However, via nanotechnology we may be witness to a new form of inexpensive access to niche R&D markets, as demonstrated by development of national nanotechnology programs in countries such as Costa Rica. Furthermore, when spending is adjusted for purchasing-power parity, Chinese government nanotechnology funding ranks second, internationally, behind the United States of America [9]. Nonetheless, funding (on an absolute basis) remains heavily focussed towards programs in industrialised countries of the European Union, the United States of America and Japan. It appears that smaller national programs will require clear, specific strategic roadmaps that target niche research and consider significant international collaboration if they wish to be part of the ‘nanotechnology revolution’. Initial applications in nanotechnology, such as in cosmetics, sporting apparatus and clothing, have exposed early indicators as to the nature of research orientation. Increasing levels of private sector patent concentration within the developed world [10], promoting ‘broadbrush’ patents, have added to developing country concerns. By the time MM arrives, corporate control in areas such as the life sciences will be so strong and patents and other forms of technological control[v] so all-encompassing, that the ability to replicate a multi-functional theranostic kit cheaply and rapidly may have little or no bearing on its ability to reach those in greatest need. Some have suggested that ‘economic abundance’ resulting from the realisation of MM will negate such a trend. MacGillivray disagrees, believing that with MM “the economics of production will change… human nature won’t” [11]. History also disagrees. While economic theory is based on scarcity, the current world is already one of abundance. We ‘solved’ the 'production issue' long ago. Given the world's current population, we do not need greater production to feed such a number. Rather, we require more equitable distribution of resources, reductions in consumption and the recognition that true ‘equality’ (at Western standards of living) is not sustainable. As the 2002 United Nations’ Human Development report notes, if the per capita energy consumption of developing countries were to rise to even half of that of the advanced industrial economies, the energy reserves of this finite planet soon would be exhausted [12]. Despite the orientation of early applications, a number of groups remain hopeful that nanotechnology can be ‘appropriate’ and used to fulfil the Millennium Development Goals [13-15]. Similarly, ‘nanofactories’ have been touted as ‘appropriate technology’ on the basis of their potential to reduce skilled labour and supporting infrastructure requirements [16]. However, it depends whether a nanofactory would reduce skilled or basic labour. If the latter, then it fails Schumacher’s criteria for an appropriate technology [17]. Furthermore, assessments of appropriateness must include assessments of risk. As with nanotechnology, suggestions have been made that MM could promote world peace [6] while others have cautioned that it may, initially, prove quite dangerous [18]. Consistently, reports are finding that research into nanotechnology risk is inadequate and under-funded. With MM offering less chance to both predict and react to issues of risk, the key must be to focus on global capacity building in areas of risk assessment and risk management. The problem with developed country discussions of nanotechnology for the developing world is that they often don’t progress beyond the identification of so-called ‘appropriate’ applications. Very few people have even arrived at an acceptance that there are ‘appropriate applications’, full stop. MM continues to struggle for mainstream acceptance and it is, perhaps, more likely that its fruition will come via a gradual extension of nanoscale capabilities, rather than an immediate jump to MM. In terms of capacity requirements, nanotechnology is changing both the way science is conducted within research teams and promoted to the public. As we move to a scale unable to be viewed by a standard microscope, and less likely to be comprehended, environmental and human health risk become increasingly important issues with which to engage the public. Early commentators have suggested that nanotechnology will reinforce the lessons from the GM-debate: that public participation is crucial to acceptance but ‘engineering consent’ is not a sustainable means for widespread acceptance and development. In my experience with researchers in Thailand, India and Australia, there is a strong recognition that capacity development in nanotechnology must incorporate ethicists and legal experts in terms of analysing national regulatory frameworks, maximising competitive advantage and contributing to public dialogue. Finally, nanotechnology is demanding and creating a more interdisciplinary view of science at the research level. Since MM will most probably enter in a climate shaped by nanotechnology’s legacy in these areas, it is important that such considerations extend to MM debates. All these considerations lead me to make two suggestions. The first suggestion is that we work towards a truly international nanotechnology conference some time around 2010. Such a conference would ideally occur within the United Nations framework and involve official country representatives. It would be of great benefit to the conference, in terms of productivity, if countries submitted ‘white papers’ prior to the commencement of the proceedings, outlining national capacities, strategies and proposed niche markets in nanotechnology. Such a meeting could also incorporate discussion on the proposed International Convention for the Evaluation of New Technologies[vi] and gauge reception of and progress towards MM. The Global Nanotechnology Network[vii] as well as the Asia Nano Forum[viii] provide good examples and existing infrastructure for any efforts to develop international cooperation and consensus. The second suggestion is that, replicating a method such as the United Kingdom’s Royal Academy of Engineering ‘upstreaming’ approach[ix], civil society groups should seek to increase nanotechnology and MM exposure at international ‘grassroots’ events such as the World Social Forum. Such efforts hopefully would pave the way for greater developing country engagement in academic writing and scholarship pertaining to these areas. Despite significant differences in the potential capabilities of nanotechnology and MM, nanotechnology may offer the greatest insights and means by which to influence the future impact of MM with respect to the developing world. Initially, a clear distinction must be made between nanotechnology and MM. Current nanotechnology indicators point towards increasing concern for the developing world in terms of barriers to technology access, inadequate research into environmental and human health risks, and significant demands in terms of the capacity to respond to and develop nanotechnology. Any study of MM and its potential impacts upon the developing world will gain from an appreciation of the relevant context and developments surrounding nanotechnology. End Notes i. Institute for Nanoscale Technology, University of Technology, Sydney, PO Box 123, Broadway 2007, NSW Australia. Correspondence to: donald.maclurcan [at] uts.edu.au. ii. Hereinafter referred to as ‘nanotechnology’. iii. The development of a ‘nanofactory’ and the resultant capability of “efficient, low-cost production of high quality goods” [1]. iv. Based on economic, education, research focus and political support data. v. See Shand’s comments on terminator technologies [9]. vi. Suggested by researchers from the Action Group on Erosion, Technology and Change and University of Toronto Joint Centre for Bioethics. vii. More at: [www.globalnanotechnologynetwork.org] viii. More at: http://www.asia-nano.org/index.php. ix. See The Royal Society and Royal Academy of Engineering’s 2004 report titled, “Nanoscience and Nanotechnologies: Opportunities and Uncertainties” for greater explanation. References 1. Drexler K. E., Peterson C. and Pergamit G., Unbounding the Future, The Nanotechnology Revolution, William Morrow and Company, Inc., New York 1991. 2. South African Nanotechnology Initiative, "National Nanotechnology Strategy: Nanowonders - Endless Possibilities, Volume 1, Draft 1.5", South African Nanotechnology Initiative and the Department of Science and Technology, Pretoria, 2003. 3. Maclurcan D. C., 2005, "Nanotechnology and Developing Countries: Part 1 - What Possibilities". Accessed on: October 30, 2005. Available: http://www.azonano.com/Details.asp?ArticleID=1428 . 4. ETC Group, "The Big Down: From Genomes To Atoms", ETC Group, Winnipeg, 2003. 5. Cascio J., 2005, "WorldChanging Nanotechnology". Accessed on: September 30, 2005. Available: http://www.worldchanging.com/archives/003445.html . 6. McCarthy T., 2004, "Molecular Nanotechnology and the World System". Available: http://www.mccarthy.cx/WorldSystem/intro.htm . 7. Treder M. (Private Communication). 8. Maclurcan D. C., 2005, "Nanotechnology and Developing Countries: Part 2 - What Realities". Accessed on: October 30, 2005. Available: http://www.azonano.com/Details.asp?ArticleID=1429 . 9. Lux Research, “Ranking the Nations: Nanotech's Shifting Global Leaders”, Lux Research Inc., New York, 2005. 10. Shand H., "New Enclosures: Why Civil Societies and Governments Need to Look Beyond Life Patenting", The New Centennial Review, 3 (2), pp. 187-204, 2003. 11. Regis E., Nano: the emerging science of nanotechnology: remaking the world - molecule by molecule, Little Brown, Boston, ed. 1st 1995. 12. UNDP, Human Development Report: Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World, Oxford University Press, New York 2002. 13. Court E., Daar A. S., Martin E., Acharya T. and Singer P. A., 2004, "Will Prince Charles Et Al Diminish the Opportunities of Developing Countries in Nanotechnology?" Accessed on: February 20, 2004. Available: http://www.nanotechweb.org/articles/society/3/1/1/1 . 14. Barker T. et al., 2005, "Nanotechnology and the Poor: Opportunities and Risks". Accessed on: January 26, 2005. Available: http://nanotech.dialoguebydesign.net/rp/NanoandPoor2.pdf . 15. UNCTAD, 2004, "Interactive Dialogue on Harnessing Emerging Technologies to Meet the Millennium Development Goals". Accessed on: September 3, 2004. Available: http://stdev.unctad.org/unsystem/emerging.htm . 16. Center for Responsible Nanotechnology, 2002, "Benefits of Molecular Manufacturing". Accessed on: October 20, 2003. Available: http://www.crnano.org/benefits.htm . 17. Schumacher E. F., Small is Beautiful: a study of economics as if people mattered, Blond & Briggs, London 1973. 18. Center for Responsible Nanotechnology, "By Whom?" C-R-Newsletter, no. 19, 2004 ( http://crnano.typepad.com/crnblog/2004/05/by_whom.html ). About the Author Don Maclurcan is a PhD candidate with the Institute for Nanoscale Technology at the University of Technology, Sydney, Australia. His research investigates the extent to which nanotechnology creates new possibilities or imposes new demands for developing countries.